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INTRODUCTION
In the midst of  a highly depressed economy,  the Port  of Duluth-Superior
remains a vital center of  regional activity  linking the Twin Ports  to
national and international markets.  Increases  in the volume of  cargo
handled in the Ports have both direct and indirect economic impacts  on  the
region.  Constraints  to expanded port activity reduce  these impacts,  and
make Duluth-Superior  less competitive with other U.S.  ports.  Among these
constraints is  the  length of  the  open shipping season.  Duluth-Superior
faces seasonal temperature variations which force winter closings  due to
freezing from mid-December through March in most  years.  Extending  the open
shipping season has been argued to be a potentially significant means  of
increasing the competitive position of  the Port,  reducing unemployment and
stimulating additional economic activity in the  region.
The purpose of this  paper is  to  review  the case  for season extension.
We do  not propose to  repeat  previous analyses of  season extension  in  the
St.  Lawrence Seaway  system as  a whole.  Rather, we have attempted  to pro-
vide a framework for decision-making relevant  to  the particular  problems  of
Duluth-Superior and its economy.  We have also attemped to avoid projec-
tions unsupported by hard data.  While this may limit  the study, we feel  it
important to emphasize both the  complexity and the  difficulty of drawing
firm conclusions from present information sources.
First, a generalized model of  season extension  is  presented, based  on
the  risks and benefits of  an extended season given both climatic  and demand
uncertainty.  The model is  applied to  the Port of Duluth-Superior  to-2-
illustrate the  risky decision problem facing policy makers  and Port  offi-
cials.  Second, existing documentation and new evidence  gathered by  the
authors is used to assess  the  likely contribution of  season extension to
economic development in the Port  of Duluth-Superior.  A third section pre-
sents our conclusions.-3-
I.  THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF SEASON EXTENSION:
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
Whenever inclement weather interacts  with shipping decisions, the
benefits of  continued commercial operation must  be  weighed against  the
accompanying  risks of damage or delay.  In the Great Lakes and  St.  Lawrence
Seaway system, these  risks arise from cold weather and ice formation that
blocks shipping into and  out of  ports  along the  route.  Especially
vulnerable are those ports farthest to  the North and  at greatest  distance
from international shipping lanes  in the Atlantic.  Duluth-Superior  is  such
a location, requiring roughly ten days  to  reach from the mouth of  the St.
Lawrence through the Welland Canal.  For this  reason,  the Port has  tradi-
tionally  closed in December, reopening again when the ice  goes out  in  the
spring.
From the perspective of  both  ocean and lake shippers,  the commercial
benefits of  offloading and onloading cargo  from Great Lakes ports  late in
the season must  be weighed against the  risks  of  suffering ice  damage or
losing use of  the  large capital investment of  a vessel until the ice goes
out.  From the perspective  of  the Port,  the  commercial activity foregone
due to  ice formation represents a serious  cost which if  eliminated will
lead to increased demand.  Season extension  is  attractive both because it
would spread out  capital costs of  operating  the port  facility, and would
reduce the inventory costs of  shippers.  However, assurance must exist  that
the Port,  if declared open, will in fact  remain so  regardless of weather
conditions.  Because ship cargoes  are contracted many months  in advance,
the  risk associated with ice  formation creates  an incentive for  both ship-
pers and Port  authorities  to  set a season closing  date which, at  a minimum,-4-
allows the ten-day trip  to  and from the Atlantic to.be  guaranteed in all
but the most extraordinary years.
Modern technology has  also enhanced the  capacity of  the U.S.  Coast
Guard and Army Corps  of Engineers  to  increase  the length of  the navigation
season.  "Bubblers" can  retard  the rate  of  formation of harbor  ice.
Together with improved ice-breaking  capacity, this  technology has  led  in
recent years  to moderate extensions in  the mandatory closing date, which in
1983 was  set at December 15.  In  the  late  1970's  the shipping  season on  the
Upper Lakes was kept open for 12  months on an experimental basis.  In  1984,
a malfunctioning bridge  near Montreal, Quebec, coupled with warm weather,
led  to  record extension in the  season, which ended in Duluth with the  last
departure of  an ocean vessel on December 23,  compared to  the earlier  record
of December 16,  1979.  This experience emphasized  the complex interaction
between ice  conditions due  to weather,  the level of-demand,  and the deci-
sions  of  shippers and Port authorities when to close operations.
This complex problem may be analyzed in terms of  a trade-off known to
statisticians  as  false positive and  false negative predictions,  or Type I
and Type II  error.  Type I statistical error, or  a "false positive"  predic-
tion,  results when a null  nypothesis of  "no effect"  is  rejected in favor of
an alternative hypothesis when the null  hypothesis is  in  fact  true.  Type
II  statistical error, or a "false  negative"  prediction,  results  from
failure to  find evidence against  the null hypothesis  of  "no effect,"
leading to a prediction that  turns  out  to  be  false.
Expressed in terms  of  ice  formation in  the Port  of Duluth-Superior,
this relationship arises  in  the following way.  Suppose  that  it  is conjec-
tured by  the Port Authority  that ice will have  no effect  on harbor opera--5-
tions until December 30.  The alternative hypothesis  is  that  such effect
will occur earlier than December 30.  Based on  the  null hypothesis of  "no
effect,"  a closing date would be  given by backing  off  ten days,  to December
20,  or long enough  for ships  carrying international cargo to get  through
the  Seaway and  into  the  open sea.  The alternative hypothesis would lead  to
an even earlier closing date.  In  this situation,  two  types of  error  are
possible.  First, the  null hypothesis may be  rejected in favor of  an
earlier closing date to assure safety, yet  conditions may ultimately  indi-
cate that  it  should have been accepted.  A "false positive"  relationship
will have caused the Port to  close early when  it  should have remained open.
The opportunity costs of  this  action are  incurred by  the Port  in  the form
of  lost  revenue from shipments.  On the  other hand, a decision may be  made
to  leave the Port open until December 20,  and conditions may be  such that
ice arrives earlier than predicted.  Here, costs  are incurred due  to  damage
to boats,  ice clearing, or lost  reputation to  the Port.  A "false negative"
error results  from accepting the  "no effect"  hypothesis when it  proves  to
be false.
The probability of Type I error (resulting in too  early a closing
date) must be weighed against  the probability of  Type II  error  (resulting
in too  late a closing date) whenever a particular date for closing  is  cho-
sen.  The relationship between these variables  is  expressed below, where Ho
represents the null hypothesis of  "no effect"  and Ha the alternative
hypothesis  that ice will affect shipping before  a given date.-6-
Ho:  No ice before December 30
Ha:  Ice before December 30
Decision
State of  the World  Accept Ho:  Reject Ho:
No  ice until December 30  Ice before December 30
Ho  true:  Correct decision  Incorrect decision
No ice  before December 30  (False positive-Type
I  error)
Ha true:  Incorrect  decision  Correct decision
Ice before December 30  (False negative-Type II
error)
As can be seen, the particular date chosen (here December 30)  will
determine the relative likelihood of Type I and Type II  error.  The earlier
the date,  the lower the  likelihood that  the  no effect hypothesis  (Ho) will
be accepted and then found  to be wrong due to early ice formation.  Hence,
early closing guards against Type  II  error and its associated costs.
However, such early dates  also raise  the likelihood  that Type I error will
result, in which shipping could have continued beyond  the  closing date  but
is  prevented from doing so.  In summary, the later  the  closing date  chosen,
the higher the likelihood  that the  no effect  hypothesis will prove  false
(Ha will prove true),  leading to  shipping tie-ups  and ice  clearing expen-
ses.  The earlier the closing date  chosen, the higher the  likelihood that
the harbor will  be clear and open for shipping but unavailable  for use.
This problem may be expressed as  a trade-off between risks  and  bene-
fits (Runge, 1983)  of  the  following form.
Let
At = a random variable defining the  ice thickness  and associated
weather conditions in the Duluth harbor at  closing date t.
T = a random variable defining the threshold level  of  ice thickness
and associated weather  conditions deemed acceptable by  shippers.-7-
These variables are assumed continuously distributed with nonzero mean and
variance.
E(At) = VA;  V(At)  = aA
E(T)  = pT;  V(T)  = aT
The term pA measures  the mean weather and ice conditions  at a given date  t,
such as December 30, while aA measures the variance  of  these conditions
from year to year.  The mean value pT represents  the  threshold weather and
ice  conditions  acceptable to  the average shipper, while aT represents  the
variance resulting from differences  in various  types of  shippers.  Russian
boats, for example, are known to  tolerate difficult ice  conditions  due to
the strength of  their hulls, while Asian crews  find winter conditions in
the Port difficult to tolerate.
It  should be noted that aA and aT represent  the  two  types of uncer-
tainty most  important to  the Port.  These are variations  in weather con-
ditions on the date the Port will be  closed and differences  in shippers'
attitudes toward cold  and ice.  The dilemma facing the Port  is:  at what
date should closing be  set  so  that  the weather and  ice conditions are  most
likely to  be at or below the  threshold of  acceptability to  the average
shipper?  The probability that on this  date the  cold and ice  conditions
are, in fact,  less  than the  threshold, measures  the  interaction between  the
two  types of  uncertainty, and indicates  the net  risk  facing the Port  in
choosing a particular closing date t.  Denoting this  risk by Rt, we have
Rt = Pr  (At < T) > 0
= Pr  [(A t - T) <  0]  >  0
The interval (At - T) defines a third random variable, capturing the
difference between the weather  and ice  conditions at  a particular date  t-8-
and the threshold of acceptable  conditions to  shippers.  The probability
that this  interval is  negative is  the  risk that  the weather and ice  con-
ditions will be below the threshold acceptable to the  average shipper at  a
given date t.  Lowering Rt  thus  requires choosing a date for closing in
which this  probability is  small.  The most obvious way to do  this  is  to
move the date up  to the point  that  ice will  never be  a problem, even in  the
most extraordinary years.  This risk-minimizing strategy is  clearly costly,
however, since it  leads  to  the  loss  of  revenues  that would otherwise be
generated by having the port open.  On  the other hand,  increasing the  risks
by extending the season, while it  increases  the  benefits associated with
shipments,  raises the  costs  of keeping the Port open, especially if  all  but
the most intrepid shippers  opt  out of  moving cargo as  insurance costs
mount.  In this  sense, the model defines  the  tradeoffs between risks  and
benefits of  choosing a particular closing date.
This argument may be brought together with the analysis  of Type I and
Type II error above  by recognizing that  the null  hypothesis of  no effect
implies  that the date chosen is  sufficiently early  that the  threshold will
not be crossed.  The "no effect"  null hypothesis Ho and  the alternative
hypothesis Ha may therefore be  rewritten in  terms  of  (At - T).
Ho:  (At - T) > 0
Ha:  (At - T) < O
If  Ho proves  true,  then the date chosen must have been early enough  to
avoid the threshold, but  if Ha proves  true,  then the date chosen was  not
early enough.  Since the  net  risk of  choosing a date t is Rt = Pr  [(A t - T)
< 0]  > 0, a positive value of  R for  a given date t can only result  if  there
is  some positive probability  that Ha  is  true.-9-,
We can summarize  the analysis  in terms of  the basic trade-off between
the  risks of  a particular  closing date and the expected benefits and  costs
of  that closing date expressed in terms  of  shipping  revenues,  employment
effects, and indirect economic effects.  A net  expected economic benefits
function G(A) associated with direct shipping activity and  indirect  effects
is  maximized by choosing  t, a closing date, subject to the  level of  risk
associated with  that date Rt. If  B(At ) are the benefits  of  shipping up to
that date, and C(At)  are  the  costs of  keeping the Port open through bubbler
operation, ice-breaking, etc.,  then the problem in any year is  to  choose t
so as  to maximize the discounted stream of  benefits in that year (where r
is  the annual discount  rate, reflecting the opportunity cost  of  capital)
subject to an acceptable level of  risk R*.  This may be written
Maximize G(A) = E  B[(At)  - C(At)
(1  + r)
subject  to:
R* - R(At)  > 0
At  >  0
The constraint R* - R(At)  > 0 implies  that R(At ) < R*,  where R* is an
acceptable  level of  risk.  In words, the  risk associated with a closing
date t must be  less  than some  "given"  level R* set  by government policy  or,
perhaps more significantly, by shipping insurers.  This constraint  captures
the uncertainty that makes  the problem more  complex than an ordinary
benefit-cost calculation in which the marginal benefits of  season extension
are set equal to marginal costs to  derive an "optimal"  closing date t.  The
Lagrangian expression for  this constrained optimization problem takes  the
form-10-
L =  E ~[B(A t ) - C(At)]  + X[R* - R(At)]
(1  + r)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions  for a maximum are:
(1)  <  Aa  =0 aA-  tDaA t  t
ax  ax (2)  1f2o  xAa=o
(3)  At >0O  X  0
These conditions can be useful in analyzing the  trade-offs between benefits
and  risks.  The first pair are  conditions for a maximum level of  net  bene-
at fits  to the Port.  If  the date chosen is  such that  ~L  = 0  and A  > 0,  then
A  t t  '
an interior maximum is  achieved.  In  this  case, an optimal date  is  chosen
by setting the marginal benefits of  the closing date equal to marginal
costs.
MB =  MC
If  risk is a binding constraint,  due to  government policy or insurance
costs, or any other factors  leading to  recognition that a positive  risk
exists that  ice conditions may surpass  the threshold,  first order con-
ditions for a maximum take  the form
-- = MB - MC  = 0 ~  aA t  At
so  that
aR
MB - X  = MC
ataattatt  a  a
Here, an optimal closing date requires  that  the marginal riskiness of  closing-11-
aR t
t
date t, aAt . weighted by  the  shadow value X  attached  to  this  risk,  be deducted
from marginal benefits before  they are  set equal to marginal  costs.  As
either the shadow value or the  riskiness of  a closing date rises,  reflected
in such factors as  insurance costs,  this  risk factor  increases  in magni-
tude, urging earlier closing dates.  It  is  therefore necessary  to estimate
the  riskiness  of a given closing date, ex ante, as  well as  to weight  this
riskiness according to the value  reflected in  such factors  as  insurance
rates  before an  "optimal" closing date can  be  chosen.
In summary, an analytical  description of  the  risks  and benefits of
choosing a particular closing date indicate  not only the  complexity of  the
decision, but  its dependence on a variety of  forces  largely outside the
control of the Port.  The two most important  forces  are  weather and  the
willingness of  shippers to make the journey in the  face of  these conditions
during the winter months.  This willingness  is  in turn a function of
domestic and international market  conditions which are  also beyond  the
control of  the Duluth-Superior economy.  Because  these forces are unpredic-
table, uncertainty over their values  interacts  to define  the net  risk of
setting a particular closing date t.
Reducing this  risk requires either an earlier closing date, or
substantial investment by  the Port  and  the  larger Seaway system to  remain
open in winter.  In either case, costs  are  involved.  In the  first  case,
costs will be  borne by  the private  sector dependent on  the Port  due to
foregone shipping activity, as  well as  by state or  federal government
transfers to  those eligible for unemployment  compensation.  In  the second
case, costs will be borne by  shippers  in the  form of  private  insurance, and
by  the Coast Guard and Seaway system in the form of  maintenance and  ice-12-
clearing to keep  the Port and Seaway open.  These are the fundamental
trade-offs between risks  and potential net  benefits  of  season extension.
We now turn to what  is known about  the factors  affecting these  risks  and
benefits.-13-
II.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON  SEASON EXTENSION
The generalized risk-benefit model above calls  for a variety of
empirical data not  all of  which are  strictly quantified,  or even quan-
tifiable.  While useful in analysis,  the model cannot be "solved" to give  a
precise date for season extension,  primarily because it  rests on particular
attitudes toward risk, and thus the  relative weight given to  the uncertain-
ties discussed above.  We have  been able  to gather information on a variety
of  components, however, which allow us  to make provisional remarks on
season extension in the Port  of  Duluth/Superior.  This  information may be
divided into three  categories:  (1)  weather  conditions and variability;  (2)
shipping trends  by  season (time of  year);  (3) disaggregated economic bene-
fits and costs.  After presenting this information, we  shall comment  on  its
interpretation and relationship  to  the issue-of  risks  raised in  the  first
section of  the paper.
(1)  Weather Conditions and Variability
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data on Great
Lakes weather conditions  (Assel, et.al.,  1983) were analyzed  to  identify
the mean and variance of  ice  cover in Lake Superior  and in bays  and har-
bors.  Ice  charts for 20 winters  (1960-1979) and  air temperatures over  an
80 winter period  (1898-1977) were used to  estimate the likelihood of  incle-
ment weather and ice conditions by various  dates.  Large  differences
existed in Lake Superior ice  cover in  the 20 winters from 1960 to  1979,
although maximum ice  charts for  the  last half  of December and January show
a persistent area of  open water in early winter.  This open water extends
over virtually the entire  lake in December, the Eastern half  of  the lake
during January 1-15,  and smaller areas  in the Eastern lake  during January-14-
16-31.  There is  also a persistent pattern of open water, restricted  to  the
Northeastern quadrant of  the lake,  in late April  during the ice  break-up
period.  Ice cover builds gradually in  the late  fall and  continues  all  the
way through March, during which  it begins  to decline.
Specific measurement  of  ice conditions at Duluth-Superior  are shown in
Figure  1, which compares mean ice  thickness  at  various points  in  the calen-
dar year.  The Duluth Harbor chart describes  the  amount of  clear ice and
white ice measured in the Port  from 1967-68  to  1976-77  (Assel, et.al.,
1983,  pp.  13-15).  Two  traces of  ice  thickness  are shown.  The outer curve
indicates the mean ice  thickness  for both clear  and white ice  (white ice  is
defined as  snow-ice, slush, pancake, brash, and ball  ice),  while the  inner
curve indicates  the amount  of  clear ice  only.  As Figure  1 demonstrates,
ice  begins to build in Duluth-Superior  in December, increasing its  rate of
accumulation in late December and early January.
Variation from season to  season is,  however, substantial.  Figure.2
shows maximum, minimum and normal  ice  concentration distributions  for Lake
Superior for nine half-month periods from December 16-31  (D2) to April
16-30  (A2) (Assel, et.al.,  1983,  p. 23).  The  range from minimum to  maximum
ice cover clearly suggests  the high variance  in seasonal ice  cover from
year  to year, underscoring the difficulty of making season closing deci-
sions  on the basis  of  "normal" conditions.  This variance increases  from
December into January, so  that  in a given year,  the  lake may be  open,
closed, or partially open in mid-January.  This  tendency is shown  by Figure
2 in map reproductions  (Assel, et.  al.,  1983,  pp.  26,  28)  for extremes in
ice cover for January 1-15  and January  16-31 from 1960-1979.  In  contrast
to  the maxima and minima,  the  "normal" ice  cover  clearly fails  to  reflect-15-
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this wide variation.  As  noted  above, variance in ice conditions  at  a given
date t, represented in our model by aA, is  an important  source of  risk in
setting a closing date.
Turning from ice  cover  to more general data on weather severity, data
have been collected on freezing degree-days  (FDD), defined as  the dif-
ference between 0° Centigrade and the  average of  the daily maximum and
daily minimum temperatures.  If,  for  example, average temperature  on a
given day  is -4° C, 4 FDD's  are accumulated  for the  day, and if  it  is  4° C,
4 FDD's are  subtracted for  the day.  A summation  of FDD's  is  started in  the
fall and continued until April.  The maximum FDD accumulation usually
occurs  in March.  Early accumulation of FDD's  is  evidence of winter
severity.  The cumulative frequency distribution of  FDD's gives  evidence  of
this  severity.  Based on data from 1898-1977  (Assel, et.al.,  1983,  p. 17),
the  climatology of  seasonal FDD's is  illustrated  in Figure 3,  which again
shows the considerable variation in temperatures  in relation to  mean
values from year to year during  the  80-winter  period.  Variations are,
however, more pronounced later in winter, during February and March, than
in December and January when season extension would be  most likely.
More important  to  the analysis of season extension  is  the subseasonal
or monthly variation in temperature.  Table 1 shows  the 80-winter mean
accumulated FDD's  for 1898-1977  for 5 locations  on Lake  Superior.  With the
exception of Thunder Bay, Ontario, Duluth shows  the  earliest accumulation
of  FDD's  on Lake Superior.  Deviations  from this mean are reported in Table
2.  Downward deviations correlate closely with ice  formation.  As  in the
case of  ice  cover, a highly variable pattern from year to  year exists.
The general picture emerging from this  data is  one  of considerable
variation in cold and ice  conditions  from year to year, increasing the-21-
FIGURE 3.  Eighty-winter mean and four-winter extremes of lake-
averaged freezing degree-days  for Lake Superior.
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overall uncertainty associated with a fixed season  closing date.  What  is
more, when the more recent  period 1960-1977  is  compared with the  long term
1898-1977 mean, FDD's  appear to have increased  (Assel, et.  al.,  1983).
This suggests a trend toward earlier, colder winters in the more recent
period, as  suggested by Table 2.  Overall, these  data suggest that  substan-
tial variability in potential season length will probably continue.
Whether the movement  toward colder winters is  part  of a longer term trend
is  too complex an issue to  be addressed  in  this analysis.  The 1960-1977
period would suggest  that mean values  for  cold and ice  conditions,  repre-
sented by 1A in the model above, are  generally becoming colder earlier in
the season.  However, the high variability from year to year, represented
by aA,  reinforces the riskiness of  any fixed closing date.
(2)  Shipping Trends  by Season
In addition to uncertainty over cold and ice  conditions, a second area
of uncertainty concerns the  average level of  demand for  commodities moving
through  the Great Lakes from year to  year.  Existing estimates of  future
demand depend on behavioral assumptions  and a variety of  guesses  as  to  the
increases  in demand due  to season extension.  Earlier studies  (Schenker,
et.  al.,  1972,  and U.S. Army Corps  of Engineers,  1979)  acknowledge  these
uncertainties, even given the data provided by  the  test period of open
navigation on the Upper Lakes.
Using data from 1979-1984, we can estimate  the average  impact of
alternative  lengths  of  season extension on recent  levels of  tonnage, and
calculate the approximate economic effects on  those parts of  the
Duluth-Superior economy most  directly affected by  shipping activity.  To do
so, however, it  is  important  to examine  recent  trends  in shipping activity-25-
in the  Port.  Table 3 shows  total waterborne commerce over the period
1979-1984,  indicating a decrease in cargo tonnage  (of 44  percent) from
1979-1983, with some  recovery in  1984.  This decrease arose in large part
from secular decline  in the taconite ore industry and from economic
recession, together with reduced grain exports, especially  corn shipments.
These forces were reinforced by government actions, together with general
increases in the value of  the dollar over the  period.  The Carter grain
embargo, in particular, led  to substantial declines  in Soviet October
purchases for December  lifting of  corn, which provides an important  share
of  late season Port  activity.  Such October purchases are a significant
share of  total grain handled, reflecting the bimodal  distribution of  port
activity  in the spring and  fall of  the year.  Seasonal  concentration of
shipping activity is  important  to  estimates  of  the impact  of  season exten-
sion.  Volumes of  grain handled by Duluth-Superior elevators  in 1982,  for
example, as  reported to  the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, show high levels  of
activity with peaks in April or May  and mid-October,  a drop  in mid-summer
(prior to grain harvests)  and  total cessation in winter.  Soviet purchases
alone declined from 884,611 metric tons  in 1979  (the year prior  to both  the
embargo and the beginning of  the  rise in  the dollar)  to  15,210 metric tons
in 1981  (by 98  percent).  In  1983,  the  resumption of  Soviet shipping still
led to  only 122,755 metric tons  of October purchases.
In  1984,  increases in exports  to  the Soviet Union, coupled with the
effects of  improved domestic economic  activity, were joined by warm
weather.  This relatively favorable combination of  circumstances increased
total metric tonnage  to 32,500,000.  While  this  recovery can be attributed
in part to  the extended  1984  season, it  may  be  largely the  result of  unpre--26-
TABLE 3.  Number  of Vessels and Cargo  in Metric  Tons--
Port  of  Duluth/Superior,  1979-1984.
6-Year
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  Average
Number  of
Vessels  2,164  1,829  1,728  1,137  1,195  1,285  1,556
Cargo
Tonnage  43,813  37,853  36,407  25,620  28,824  32,500  34,170
Tons per
Vessel  20.24  20.69  21.06  22.53  24.12  25.29  21.96
SOURCE:  Port Authority of Duluth-27-
dictable  shifts  in both weather and shipping demand.  Hence,  it would be  an
error to interpret  1984 as  an indicator of  the impacts  of  season extension
in general.  In any given year, these impacts may be  greater, or  less,  than
observed in 1984.
A general decline in activity is  also reflected in  the number of
vessels calling at  the Port from 1979-1984.  Oceangoing vessels declined
from 370  in 1979  to 249  in 1984  (down 33  percent);  and all  ships declined
from 2,164 in 1979 to 1,285  in  1984  (down 41 percent).  Oceangoing vessels
as  a percentage of  total  shipping declined  from 17  percent  of all  vessels
in 1979  to 15  percent  in  1981, but  increased to  19  percent  of  the much
smaller number of  vessels in 1984.  The number of  ships  declined propor-
tionately more than tonnage because the average ship size increased.  This
was more dramatic for lake vessels  than ocean vessels  because older,
smaller lake vessels, which have higher operating costs per ton, have been
taken out of  service as demand has  declined.  Despite  the improvement  in
1984,  this trend  reinforces the tonnage data.
Shipping activity  appears to be headed generally downward at  the  Port.
This may be due to the  risk aversion of  shippers,  but  could also  be due  to
national and international competition for  low cost  commodities or
increased competition from other trade routes.  For example, low barge
rates in recent years have presented strong competition  for several  lake
ports,  including Duluth-Superior.  The  causes  of  the decline  in shipping
activity could be based on  risk,  cost,  or both.
(3)  Economic Costs  and Benefits
These trends  are, of  course,  a major reason why calls for season
extension continue.  Most of  these  calls  are predicated  on claims  con--28-
cerning the impact of  such extensions on the local  economy.  To  date,  esti-
mates of  the impact of Port activity  on  the economy  of Duluth have  been
largely  based on a 1976  study by J.F.P.  (Jeno F. Palucci) and Associates in
a Port Authority of Duluth mimeo, undated.  The  value added calculations
performed in that study were originally based  on 1972-1974 data and  have
since been updated.  The value added calculations  were combined with esti-
mates of  a "multiplier effect"  of 2.57  times direct  income  to  determine
overall impacts.  We  were unable to determine how value-added calculations
were arrived at  in the  1976 study, and can therefore neither endorse nor
criticize its  results.  Multiplier effects,  while difficult to  test empiri-
cally, are  deserving of further study  in light of  secular trends  in
industry and commerce since 1970.
Perhaps the  best available current  information indicating the direct
impact  of Port activity  on  the local economy  is  provided by  longshoremens'
unions,  notably the  I.L.A.  Marine Association Welfare Fund.  Data on  total
hours worked by longshoremen from 1979-1984  in both the Port of Duluth and
Superior are broken down by  cargo, grain handling, cleaning and  fitting.
Table 4 indicates  that total  longshoreman hours worked declined in  the Twin
Ports from 207,700 to  152,568  (26 percent)  from 1979  to 1984.  The distri-
bution of hours worked indicates slight  increases in cargo handlings with
substantial decreases in grain handling.  Grain handling hours  in Duluth
fell  by  11 percent,  18  percent, 4 percent, 25  percent and  10 percent
respectively  in each year from 1979-80  to  1983-84,  or an average decline of
13.6  percent over the  five year period.  In  Superior, yearly percentage
declines in grain handling were 9 percent in 1979-80,  8 percent  in  1980-81,
31  percent  in 1981-82,  an increase of  10  percent  in 1982-83  and a decline
of  13.8  percent  in 1983-84,  or an average decline of  10.4  percent.-29-
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One reason for this decline was the  reduction in overall commerce
discussed above.  However, inspection of  grain handling facilities  in  the
Port  also suggests a strong trend toward  increasing substitution of  capital
for  labor.  One grain elevator, while newer  than many others, employs  only
21 or 22 men to load grain on board ships.  All but  a handful work as
sweepers to keep dust levels  down.  Actual loading can be  accomplished by
three  or  four men assisted by  computer-operated  loading machinery.  This
technology may be expected to  characterize future bulk cargo  loading faci-
lities in the Port, if DuluthSuperior is  to remain competitive.
According to the  I.L.A. Marine Association Welfare Fund, longshoremen
straight  time pay was $15.08  per hour  in 1984  and overtime pay was $22.50
per hour.  Since approximately 45 percent  of all  hours worked are  overtime
due  to the seasonal concentration of  loading, the direct economic effects
of Port activity  included $2.8 million in wage  income for longshoremen
alone.  Not all of  this wage  income will be  spent;  some will be saved.  And
of  the proportion spent,  not  all will be  spent  locally.  Although
longshoremens' wages in isolation clearly understate the  direct effects of
Port activity, they are firmly grounded  in existing data and  involve no
imputations  or  guesstimates.
Longshoremens'  hours  can be used as  a proxy to  estimate the  relative
impact of  season extension on Port employment,  or at  least  on  its most
immediately affected individuals.  Since the impact  on longshoremen is  the
most dramatic direct employment effect  of  season extension, studying this
impact will provide insight into other, less  obvious effects.  Table 5
shows  tons of  cargo per hour and hours worked per vessel by  longshoremen
from 1979-1984.  Tons  of  cargo per hour worked fell from 1979  to  1983 while-31-
TABLE  5.  Tons Per Hour and  Per Vessel,  1979-1984.
6-Year
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  Average
Longshoreman
Hours
(in  thousands)  207.7  180.7  183.5  158.6  155.3  152.6  173.1
Cargo Tons
(in thousands)  43,813  37,853  36,407  25,620  28,824  32,500  34,170
Tons/Hour  210  209  198  162  186  213  197
Vessels  2,164  1,829  1,728  1,137  1,195  1,285  1,556
Hours/Vessel  96  99  106  139  130  119  111-32-
hours worked per vessel rose,  reflecting an overall trend toward  fewer
vessels  and less  cargo for  the established work force.  In 1984  there was
an increase in tons of  cargo  per hour to 213,  and a decline in  hours per
vessel to  119.  Tons of  cargo  per vessel has  increased over the period,
reflecting larger vessels.  If  the six year average  of  197  tons of  cargo
loaded per longshoreman hour from 1979-84 is  used as  a base, then  the
increase in hours worked due  to season extension can be determined assuming
that  the average cargo movement  for  the year would  characterize the
extended season.  Similarly, if  the average of  111  longshoreman hours per
vessel over the period is  taken as  a baseline,  then increases  in vessels
due  to season extension can be used to  calculate approximate  increases in
hours  of  longshoreman employment.  In  effect,  these impacts consider the
potential direct  employment effect of  season extension.  Impacts  on  the
larger economy depend on assumptions  that  longshoremen represent a fixed
percentage of  this economy.
Table 6 shows the results  of  these computations  for one,  two, four and
eight week season extensions.  Using the  six year average  of  111  longshore-
man hours  per vessel and  1984 wage  levels, each additional ship  calling
during the extension would lead  to increases  in direct wage income of  $921
per week at  standard time  and $1,125  at 45  percent  overtime for a total of
$2,045.  The first  row of Table 6 shows  the additional  longshoreman wages
if 42  ships per week (the 6 year average) called during the  extended
period.  The wage increase is  approximately $86,000  per week.
Although additional benefits would undoubtedly accrue  to other  parts
of  the local economy,  data and  linkage to  larger input-output  models are
not  currently available.  This analysis assumes  that  the demand  for Port-33-
TABLE  6.  Season Extension Increase in Annual
Longshoremen's Wage Bill.l/
Number of  Length of  Extension
Additional
Vessels  1 week  2 weeks  4 weeks  8 weeks
42  ships/week
@ 111 hrs.2/
per  ship - 85,890  171,780  343,560  687,120
21  ships/week
@  111 hrs.2/
per  ship  42,945  85,890  171,780  343,560
10 ships/week
@  111 hrs.2/
per ship-'  20,450  40,900  81,800  163,600
42  ships/week
@  130 hrs. 
per  ship  /  100,170  200,340  400,680  801,360
21  ships/week
@  130  hrs.3/
per  ship'  50,085  100,170  200,340  400,680
10 ships/week
@ 130 hrs.3
per  ship - 23,850  47,700  95,400  190,800
/-Computed  from a 37-week base season using 1984  wages
with 45  percent.
Cost per vessel,  $2,045
/  Cost per vessel,  $2,045 3/
-Cost  per  vessel,  $2,385-34-
facilities during  the extended  season would be  the same  as  the average
demand during the  regular season.  It  is  also assumed that this  is  "new"
demand and is not the  result of  a substitution of  shipping during the
lengthened season in lieu  of  stockpiling.
The next  row of Table  6 shows  the  impact  of  additional demand per week
equal  to one-half  of  the  six year average.  The wage increase at  that  level
is  $43,000  per week.  If  the demand  is  only  one-fourth that  of  an average
week or 10  ships, the  longshoremen's wage impact would be  approximately
$20,000  per week.
The third and fourth rows of  table 6 show  the wage  increase  if  the
average longshoreman hours  per vessel is  130 hours  as  it  was in  1983.  This
is  17  percent more than the 6 year average.  In  that  case, the  longshoreman
wage bill per ship would be  $2,385 and the added wages per week of  exten-
sion would be $100,170.  If  only half  the number of  ships called, the addi-
tional wages would be $50,085 and  if  the added demand was  one-fourth that
of an average week, the additional  longshoreman wages would be  approxima-
tely $24,000 per week.
It  should be noted that  to get  an increase in overseas shipping,  the
St.  Lawrence  Seaway shipping  season would also have to  be extended in
phase with that  of Duluth/Superior.  Results  are  also based on  the  further
significant assumption that  longshoremen are willing to work additional
hours during the extended season.  Union contracts  require that benefits
such as  health insurance are  earned by each union member after working a
given number of  hours each year.  Working conditions during severe weather
once  the annual number of  hours  is  reached, may lead to  a reduced
willingness  to work additional hours.  This point was  stressed to  the
authors  in interviews with longshoremen representatives.-35-
III.  CONCLUSIONS
Although this study must be  considered preliminary, its  findings
suggest that in and of  itself,  season extension would contribute only
marginally to increased economic activity in the Port of  Duluth-Superior.
In the  first section of  the paper,  the complexity of  setting a date for  an
extended season was demonstrated.  As  later and  later dates are  chosen, the
risk  that shippers will refuse  to  navigate the Seaway increases along with
the costs  of keeping the system open.  Yet  it  is  clear  that too early  a
closing date can lead  to lost  revenues  in  the Port.  These risks  vary  from
year to year, making the  choice of  a single date  for closing problematic.
The foregone benefits of  too early a closing date, when weighted against
the costs and risks of  later closings,  suggest that  flexibility should be
retained whenever possible,  so  that season extensions can  be undertaken
whenever high demand coincides with warm winter weather.
Attempts to guarantee seasons extensions  longer than a few weeks,
however, will result  in substantial costs.  These costs have been well-
documented (Army Corps of Engineers,  1979).  It  is  our view, however,  that
insufficient  attention has  been given to  the  variability in such costs.
Whether benefits exceed costs  of  season extension will depend on both  the
weather and shipper demand during the  year  in question, making the entire
issue one  of decision making under uncertainty.  Uncertainty surrounds both
weather and shipping demand conditions  in a given year.
When empirical evidence  on weather conditions and shipping demand  is
evaluated more closely, the  importance of  this  variability on a year-to-
year basis  is  reinforced.  The  risk that  weather conditions will exceed the
threshold deemed tolerable  by most shippers increases as  later dates  are-36-
chosen, lowering the marginal benefits of  season  extension.  This  risk is
attributable to the considerable  deviation from "normal" winter weather
from year to year.  Data from the  last 20  years suggest  larger accumula-
tions  of  freezing degree days  (FDD's) early in  the season.  Data on
shipping volume  through the Port suggests less  variability but declining
volume with a modest recovery in 1984.  This is  due  largely to  the depen-
dence of  the  port on taconite shipments.
When the direct  economic effects of  season extension on longshoremens'
wages are examined, the result  of  one or  two week extensions  is  not  large
in relation to overall wage income.  Although effects on other sectors
would no doubt occur, data on  those direct  effects  is  lacking, and  attempts
to impute indirect and/or multiplier effects  are unverifiable at  this  time.
The modest impact  of  season extension on those most directly affected
should also be tempered by a recognition that  longshoremen may not  choose
to work the  additional weeks, because of weather  conditions and/or
favorable union contract arrangements.
In the  final analysis, we  conclude that  season extension can,  in  cer-
tain years,  increase employment and economic activity in the Port.
Flexibility in setting  the closing date should be maintained to take  advan-
tage of high demand years and favorable weather  conditions.  However,
without a much broader program of  economic development activities,  as well
as  federal and international actions leading  to  increased shipping demand,
season extension will not  substantially improve  the condition of  the  local
and regional economy.Bibliography
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